Adopting a reengineering approach to change enabled the FBI to make
immediate improvements in key areas. The approach was then expanded to
address six core processes essential to the transformation of the FBI:
(1) Intelligence; (2) Information Management; (3) Investigative Programs;
(4) Human Capital; (5) Strategic Planning & Execution; and (6) Security
Management.
As noted in the GAO symposium, transformation of any large organization
cannot occur overnight. Essential ingredients to long-term success include:
(1) top management support in identifying and analyzing core business
processes in an effort to improve overall effectiveness in accomplishing
the mission; (2) the ability to set time frames for full implementation of
transformation efforts; (3) requirements-based project management software
to assist in the tracking of key milestones and assessment points; and (4) the Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire
ability to hold managers accountable. Taking these ingredients into account,
the FBI has taken the actions necessary to make systemic organizational and
operational improvements in its continuing effort to excel in all that it does.

FBI History
Directors Then and Now
Photographs and biographies of FBI Directors since 1908
History of the FBI
Detailed description from 1908 to the present
- Origins:
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1921-1933
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1933-Late 1930's
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1930's-1945
- Postwar America:
1945-1960's
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1960's-1970's
- Aftermath of Watergate:
1970's Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire
- Rise of International Crime: 1980's
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1989-1993
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1993-2001
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2001-Present
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The J. Edgar Hoover FBI Building from start to finish

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Thousands of pages of frequently requested historical records
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Timeline of important events in FBI history

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In honor of FBI Agents killed in the line of duty
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Including gangsters, spies, and Top Tenners
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The significance of each symbol and color of the FBI seal

History of the FBI
The New Deal: 1933 - Late 1930's

The 1929 stock market crash and the Great Depression brought hard times to America. Hard times, in turn, created more criminals--and also led Americans to escape their troubles through newspapers, radio, and movies.This is a photograph of the oil fields

To combat the crime wave, President Franklin D. Roosevelt influenced Congress in his first administration to expand federal jurisdiction, and his Attorney General, Homer Cummings, fought an unrelenting campaign against rampant crime. One case highlighting the rampant crime included the swindling and murder of members of the Osage Indian tribe in Oklahoma for the rights to their oil fields.

This is a photograph of a Wanted Poster for the Lindbergh KidnapperNoting the widespread interest of the media in this war against crime, Hoover carried the message of FBI work through them to the American people. For example, in 1932, the first issue of the FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin - then called Fugitives Wanted by Police, was published. Hoover became as adept at publicizing his agency's work as he was at administering it. Prior to 1933, Bureau Agents had developed an esprit de corps, but the public considered them interchangeable with other federal investigators. Three years later, mere identification with the FBI was a source of special pride to its employees and commanded instant recognition and respect from the public. By the end of the decade, the Bureau had field offices in 42 cities and employed 654 Special Agents and 1141 Support Employees.

During the early and mid-1930s several crucial decisions solidified the Bureau's position as the nation's premier law enforcement agency. Responding to the kidnapping of the Lindbergh baby, in 1932, Congress passed a federal This is a photograph of people looking at destroyed cars from the Kansas City Massacrekidnapping statute. Then in May and June 1934, with gangsters like John Dillinger evading capture by crossing over state lines, it passed a number of federal crime laws that significantly enhanced the Bureau's jurisdiction. In the wake of the Kansas City Massacre, Congress also gave Bureau Agents statutory authority to carry guns and make arrests.

The Bureau of Investigation was renamed the United States Bureau of Investigation on July 1, 1932. Then, beginning July 1, 1933, the Department of Justice experimented for almost two years with a Division of Investigation that included the Bureau of Prohibition. Public confusion between Bureau of Investigation Special Agents and Prohibition Agents led to a permanent name change in 1935 for the agency composed of Department of Justice's investigators: the Federal Bureau of Investigation was thus born.

This is a photograph of Fingerprint Experts Contributing to its forensic expertise, the Bureau established its Technical Laboratory in 1932. Journalist Rex Collier called it "a novel research laboratory where government criminologists will match wits with underworld cunning." Originally the small laboratory operated strictly as a research facility. However, it benefitted from expanded federal funding, eventually housing specialized microscopes and extensive reference collections of guns, watermarks, typefaces, and automobile tire designs.
Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire
This is a photograph of a new agents training class at the National Academy In 1935, the FBI National Academy was established to train police officers in modern investigative methods, since at that time only a few states and localities provided formal training to their peace officers. The National Academy taught investigative techniques to police officials throughout the United States, and starting in the 1940s, from all over the world.

The legal tools given to the FBI by Congress, as well as Bureau initiatives to upgrade its own professionalism and that of law enforcement, resulted in the arrest or demise of all the major gangsters by 1936. By that time, however, Fascism in Adolph Hitler's Germany and Benito Mussolini's Italy, and Communism in Josef Stalin's Soviet Union threatened American democratic principles. With war on the horizon, a new set of challenges faced the FBI.

378. Ambassador Craigie and the Foreign Minister Culminate the Honma Incident



On November 13, 1941, when British Ambassador Craigie called on the Foreign Minister regarding some other matter, the question of Honma, Vice Consul of Rangoon, arose and the Minister criticized the British for their action in this matter. The Minister explained that of its own initiative, the Japanese Government had already issued a recall to Honma whereupon Craigie declared that the deportation by the British Government would automatically be dropped. At this point the subject was closed. During the interview the matter of returning the evidence which had been gathered for the case was not discussed but since England had discontinued its deportation order, Tokyo demanded that the evidence material immediately be returned to the office from which it was taken. [828]



379. Japanese Foreign Minister is Concerned Over Family Remittance Permits



Freezing order permits had been issued for family remittances from certain British subjects residing in Japan proper as well as those British who were working for Japan's benefit. However, as a matter of principle no other permits had been granted because it was reported that Great Britain had refused family remittances to Japan. On November 14, 1941 the Japanese Foreign Minister informed London that he would be willing to cooperate in allowing such remittances if Japanese nationals residing in England and the colonies were accorded similar privileges. [829]



380. Canadian Army Troops are Sent to the Orient



It had been rumored that Canadian Army troops would soon be sent to the Orient and as a confirmation of these reports, on the morning of November 16, 1941, a transport of the Canadian Pacific Line guarded by a British warship came into port at Hong Kong. It carried on board about 1,000 Canadian soldiers, all volunteers and of mixed nationality, who were entered in the Kuryushinho (Kana spelling) barracks. The strength and details of this division were being held in secret but according to reports another 2,000 troops were expected. Tokyo received this news on November 17, 1941, and it was relayed to Japanese officials in Canton, Shanghai, Nanking, and Ottawa. [830] On the same day Mr. Yano at Hong Kong informed Tokyo that additional information had been gathered in regard to the Canadian soldiers. A news correspondent who had visited on board the ship inadvertently revealed that Brigadier J. K. Lawson, the Canadian Commander, was in command of the 2,000 green troops whose training would begin soon after their embarkation. [831] Four days later Shanghai threw further light on the number of Canadian troops stationed in Hong Kong, for according to a JK dispatch the warship Canada had transported one regiment of 3,000 soldiers and three more regiments were en route to Hong Kong. [832]



381. Makino of the Johol Rubber Plantation is Instructed to Return to Japan



Meanwhile on November 18, 1941, Foreign Minister Togo had instructed Mr. Makino of the Johol Rubber Plantation in Singapore to make arrangements for returning to the homeland. After expediting affairs relative to the management of the plantation, all employees who could possibly be spared together Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire with the overseer were to return to Japan by way of Thailand or any of available route. The matter of the remaining Japanese, non‑residents, rested entirely with Mr. Makino. [833]



[828] IV, 685.

[829] IV, 686.

[830] IV, 687.

[831] IV, 688.

[832] IV, 689.

[833] IV, 690.



185



382. Diplomatic Relations Between Iraq and Japan are Severed



Rashid Ali Al‑Gailani, leader of the quelled anti‑English revolts in Iraq, had been receiving assistance from the Japanese and because of this alliance, the Iraq government severed diplomatic relations with the Japanese Imperial Government as of November 16, 1941. Two days later Tokyo advised Ankara of this new development and at the request of the Turkish Minister in Iraq, the Ankara officials were ordered to contact the Turkish Government in regard to caring for the legation property in Bagdad since Japanese interests were not represented there. [834]



383. Britain Removes from Office the Chief of Staff and His Assistant



In a short time the Chief of the Imperial Staff, Sir John G. Dill would have reached the age of retirement. Therefore, according to an announcement made on November 15, 1941, he was transferred from his post to the position of Governor of Bombay and was succeeded by General Sir Alan‑Brooke, Commander of the home forces. His assistant, Lt. General Pownall was also transferred to another key position and his successor was Major General A. E. Nye. Lt. General Pownall had been reared and educated in Japan and both he and General Dill were recognized authorities on that country. The General Staff, so Shigemitsu believes, was the only organ of the British government which could correctly evaluate and understand matters pertaining to Japan, and he thought, quite possible that with Japanese‑British relations at such a critical point, the removal of these men from their posts was part of a program to purge all those persons who might have leanings toward Japan. [835]



384. The Boris Arrives in Seattle



Mr. Seijiro Yoshizawa, Japanese Minister in Ottawa learned on November 18, 1941, that the Boris had arrived in Seattle but because the Captain possessed no bill of lading he was forbidden to unload his cargo. The Japanese had been asked to remove the obstacle at once and Mr. Yoshizawa requested that the Tokyo officials wire instructions to the Ottawa office immediately after contacting the Mitsui Shipping Company and taking the necessary steps to clarify the matter. [836]



385. Mr. Yoshizawa Seeks Funds for the Ottawa Legation



Officials at the Japanese legation in Ottawa had found it impossible to arrange any payments out of the frozen funds since August, 1941. After negotiating with the New York office, provisions were made to secure $3,500.00 in American money. Receiving Tokyo's approval of the measure, Mr. Yoshizawa had sent a member of his staff to New York and as a result received $10,000 in American currency; however, $3,000 of this amount was required by the Consular Office in Vancouver. Arrangements had been made for Clerk Kihara who was soon to leave New York for Seattle to deliver the money to the Ottawa officials. On November 20, the money on hand in the office amounted to $10,500 end, in the event of war another $20,000 would be available from New York. Provided that Tokyo sanctioned the receipt of this money, Mr. Yoshizawa believed that the difficulty could be surmounted without receiving funds from any other source. [837]

In the event that the evacuation of Ottawa should become necessary, the Japanese legation, the office and the interests there would be assumed preferably by Brazil but



[834] IV, 691.

[835] IV, 692.

[836] IV, 693.

[837] IV, 694.



186



THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR



should that prove impossible, Argentina would be suitable. Officials in Tokyo, Rio de Janeiro and Buenos Aires were to be contacted. In addition there was the question of Italian interests which the Japanese had taken over. If at all possible the Minister in Ottawa requested that further instructions be wired directly to him. [838]



386. Mr. Kawakasi Negotiates for Funds for the Nisso Company in Vancouver



Because of the freezing order placed on Japanese funds by the British, [839] the Nisso Company branch in Ottawa was unable to ship lumber to Japan since about $65,000 in Canadian money remained unpaid. Negotiations for the payment of these funds were to be carried out in Tokyo, and Mr. Kawakasi suggested that the Tokyo officials obtain the details of the case from Mr. Aida who had just returned to Japan from Vancouver. After the matter of supplying this money was discussed with the head office of the Nisso Company, instructions were to be sent to the branch office in Vancouver. [840]



387. Foreign Minister Togo is Concerned Over the Remaining Japanese Residents in Singapore



Originally the Asama Maru was scheduled to sail from Japan to Manila and then to Singapore arriving there on November 15, 1941, to evacuate a group of Japanese nationals from that city; [841] however, the Japanese Consul had requested that the vessel stop at Singapore before traveling to Manila since many of the passengers could not afford the longer way to the homeland. On the revised sailing schedule the Asama Maru was to leave Singapore on November 6, 1941. [842] An evacuation trip to Britain was also being planned but since negotiations were still incomplete the Asama Maru was scheduled for another round trip to Singapore. [843] On November 20, 1941, the Foreign Minister in Tokyo requested information concerning the remaining Japanese residents in Singapore after the last evacuation had taken place. The number of men, women and children were to be listed separately including their ages and their places of residence and further details were to be given in regard to how many of those remaining were engaged in farming, mining, exporting and importing, retail and miscellaneous enterprises as well as their financial condition. Should it prove impossible for those Japanese to carry on business activities as a result of the freezing legislation, Mr. Togo was to be advised as to the approximate length of time that they would be able to carry on their affairs plus the prospects for the possible removal of some of these persons into Thai or French Indo‑China. [844] Four days later, the situation having become increasingly more difficult, Foreign Minister Togo sent a dispatch to Singapore sympathizing with the unhappy lot in which the remaining Japanese residents found themselves. Despite the difficulty in bringing about further evacuation, he promised to do whatever possible in order to send another vessel to Singapore; however, in the event that the situation should become worse, he assured the Japanese merchants that their government would continue to make the best possible arrangements in order to protect the interests of those remaining nationals. [845]



[838] IV, 695.

[839] IV, 734.

[840] IV, 696.

[841] IV, 672.

[842] IV, 538.

[843] IV, 672.

[844] IV, 697.

[845] IV, 698.



187



388. Tokyo is Concerned Over British Code Material



Meanwhile the Japanese were becoming concerned over certain British code material. On November 21, 1941, a message had been sent from Peking to Tsingtao, a port in northeast China, with the information that clues had been obtained there regarding telegraphic codes being used by the British Embassy. Apparently they were being employed for communications between Shanghai, Chungking and London and though there was a possibility that they had previously been decoded by the North Army there was a chance that they might prove to be of some value. The three codes in question were the diplomatic codes, plain language abbreviations and numbers code, and information regarding them was to be wired to Peking immediately. [846] In addition the following day Tokyo wired Peking to investigate the British codes coming in at the time. A great deal of the material could not be read and though it was necessary that the investigation be a cautious one it was equally important that it be done completely and thoroughly. [847]



389. The Premier of Burma Attempts to Attain an Independent Status for His Country



On November 18, 1941 U Maung Saw, Premier of Burma who, for the past few weeks had been in London for the purpose of obtaining an independent status for his country, called at the office of Hirasawa, Japanese representative in New York. Having failed to accomplish his mission, the Premier was very disgruntled over Britain's refusal of Burma's request. As he departed London on November 14, 1941, he had not hesitated to express his dissatisfaction to a reporter of the New York Times in the presence of the British Premier. It was his wish to interview President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull and "appeal" to the British Government through the "press." After leaving New York, the Premier planned to travel to Bangkok via Canada, New Zealand and Manila arriving there around December 7, 1941, where he would remain a few days before returning to Burma. Since he realized that he would be under the strict surveillance of the British after his return, he desired to take advantage of the opportunity to confer with some influential Japanese during his visit in Bangkok. At his suggestion that he meet Consul Saito, Mr. Hirasawa gave him his calling card by way of introduction. In view of the present world conditions, the Premier apparently desired to oppose British might by means of Japan's strength. [848]



390. Hong Kong Economic Condition is Becoming Critical



On November 24, 1941 Shanghai forwarded to Tokyo a report received two days previous from Hong Kong concerning the present economic conditions in that city. On November 20, 1941 there were no more than approximately 10,000 bales of cotton thread and 4,000 bales of cotton cloth in the warehouses. Taking No. 20 Soma cotton thread in Hong Kong dollars as a standard the sudden rise in price was $345.00, $410.00 and $480.00 at the end of September, October and November 13 respectively. The factories had accepted orders for their output up to February 1942; however, the export of cotton to Japan and Shanghai was prohibited and it would have been impossible to procure the aforementioned cotton from the warehouses at as reasonable a price as had been expected. Consequently the factories would be seriously embarrassed.

Control regulations were enforced and it was decreed that the amount of cotton goods on hand must be recorded each month; that any sale and shipment of cotton must have the permission of the authorities and that a maximum selling price be affixed.



[846] IV, 699.

[847] IV, 700.

[848] IV, 701, 701A.



188



THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR



The prospects for the future were not too encouraging for when control was enforced and since there were no sellers at the unreasonably low fixed price there were many illegal transactions at high figures. In addition there was not more than a two months supply of cotton in the warehouses and eventually difficulties would arise in regard to sending khaki clothing to England. A suggested plan of operations was therefore submitted whereby it seemed expeditious to enforce a strict and thorough embargo obstructing transportation of Hong Kong products to England and the South Seas. When Hong Kong finally yielded, a plan of barter transactions in rice, flour, sugar and like commodities would be suggested. [849]



391. Tokyo is Concerned with Code and Cipher Systems



Tokyo notified Japanese officials in Washington on November 26, 1941, that they would receive and use temporarily a new keying system which had been devised by the telegraphic official in London for the cipher machine for messages between London and Tokyo. Washington was instructed to transmit to Tokyo the one word ASADA in clear text which would signify the receipt and understanding of the information. [850]

Later on December 1, 1941, Japanese officials in London received orders from Tokyo to discontinue the use of their code machine and dispose of it immediately. Extreme caution was to be observed in carrying out the instructions for its disposition and particular attention was to be directed to dismantling and destroying the important parts of the machine. At the same time the rules for use of the machine between the head office and the Ambassador resident in England were also to be burned. Upon receipt of the telegram the one word "Setuju" was to be wired to Tokyo in plain language and after the disposing instructions had been carried out the word "Hasso" would serve to notify the Japanese Foreign Office of the completion of the task. [851]

On the following day, in a message from Mr. Takanobu Mitani, Japanese Minister to Switzerland, it was learned that the Japanese diplomatic officials in North America, Canada, Panama, Cuba, the South Seas and in British and Netherlands territory, had also been ordered to burn all of their telegraphic codes with the exception of one copy of O and L. [852]

Meanwhile, on that same day, Japanese officials in Singapore received from Tokyo a table which was composed of important code words and their corresponding meaning. [853]



392. Japan Prepares for Hostilities



On December 2, 1941, Japanese officials in Canton notified Tokyo that precautionary measures had been taken should hostilities begin. The Army had completed preparations to move upon Thai and in the event that the British resisted to the end, it was prepared to occupy the country militarily. [854]

Two days later official orders for physical examinations had not yet been issued in Shanghai; however, this was going to be carried out as of the first and handled as though the order were confidentially sent on that date. [855]

On December 5, 1941, Japanese officials in Peking announced that concurrent with opening war on Britain and America, Holland would be considered a semi‑belligerent and strict surveillance would be exercised over her consulates in China. All communications between them



[848] IV, 702.

[849] IV, 703.

[850] IV, 704.

[851] IV, 705.

[853] IV, 706.

[854] IV, 707.

[855] IV, 708.



189



and the enemy countries as well as other use of code messages and wireless would be prohibited. In the event that Japan and Holland became involved in a war, the same steps be taken toward the latter country as were taken in the case of Britain and America. [856] Preparations had been made on the basis that the treatment accorded the property and staff of Britain, America and Holland in North China, would be comparable to that accorded them in occupied territory. Peking suggested that a policy be adopted whereby a suitable person of a third power such as Belgium, Spain or Brazil be recognized as custodian of the interests of Britain, America and Holland in North China. [857]

In addition, steps which would coincide with measures concerning the departure of the Japanese Consular Staffs and resident nationals were to be taken for the evacuation of the Staffs and nationals of the hostile nations. All public property belonging to enemy nations was to be seized and placed in the custody of Japan. [858]

Meanwhile the Japanese Minister in Ottawa, in interpreting recent instructions from Tokyo, surmised that should the situation become critical, his staff would be cut to the last possible man. Since they were already working on a "skeleton staff," he felt that further reduction would be impossible. However, he conceded that in such an eventuality they could probably manage with only the use of their diplomatic staff. He feared that Mr. Suzuki, apparently referring to Lt. Gen. Teiichi Suzuki of the Japanese cabinet, would prove to be an obstacle to the accepted plan and Tokyo was asked to take this into consideration. [859]

On December 7, 1941, in a circular telegram, Tokyo revealed that relations between Tokyo and England were not in accordance with expectations. [860]

The following day the local military commander paid a visit to the Japanese official in Tientsin with the information that though France maintained her neutrality, she would cooperate with Japan insofar as possible. This had come from the French Consul who had called on the military commander in regard to the recent incursion of troops into the British concessions. [861]

On December 9, 1941, in a message from Hsinking relayed to Tokyo, it was learned that immediately following the opening of hostilities, in accordance with prearranged plans, the telephone wires of the United States, British and semi‑enemy consulates in Harbin, Mukden, and Dairen were cut and their radios and automobiles were destroyed. [862]



[856] IV, 709.

[857] IV, 710.

[858] IV, 711.

[859] IV, 712.

[860] IV, 713.

[861] IV, 714.

[862] IV, 715.



190



THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR



PART C‑JAPANESE DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITIES THROUGHOUT THE WORLD



(h) Japanese‑German Relations



393. Ambassador Oshima Asks to Resign



Immediately after the appointment of Shigenori Togo to the position of Foreign Minister in Tokyo on October 19, 1941, Ambassador Hiroshi Oshima again undertook to secure a resignation from his position in Berlin. Stating that the appointment of the new Foreign Minister had been a source of much gratification to him since Mr. Togo always had been an excellent friend, Ambassador Oshima pointed out that although he formerly had been in a position to offer assistance to the new cabinet, in view of the policy which would now most assuredly be undertaken, he felt unable to continue representing the Japanese government in absolute harmony with its new policies.

The Ambassador pointed to the fact that on previous occasions, during the office of Foreign Minister Matsuoka, he had requested permission to resign and now in view of conflicting opinions, he could only hinder the new Foreign Minister. [863]

On October 30, 1941 Tokyo wired its refusal stating that Ambassador Oshima now occupied a very important position and no temporary appointee could satisfactorily hold it down. Foreign Minister Togo suggested that for the time being Ambassador Oshima subject his personal desires to the common good of the Empire. [864]



394. Japan Sees an Increase of British and American Aid to Russia



Probably one important reason for Tokyo's refusal to grant the Ambassador's plea was the increasingly urgent situation created by growing British aid and American lend‑lease to Russia. On October 20, 1941, Foreign Minister Togo in Tokyo readdressed a London dispatch to Berlin which stated that although the German army had been advancing at a surprising speed on Moscow, these gains were counter‑balanced by British impatience and the British Parliament's sudden decision to step up its aid to the Red Army. Although there was some debate resulting from minor opposition to such a move, Ambassador Namoru Shigemitsu in London believed that Prime Minister Churchill would not choose to listen to the arguments of amateur strategists and would more firmly entrench his policy of giving military aid to Russia. [865]

In order to explain Great Britain's attitude, it was believed that since the Soviet had proved itself capable of stronger resistance than had been anticipated, Great Britain realized the strategy of keeping Germany occupied on its eastern front. This view, according to the Japanese Ambassador in London, was not only upheld by the government and the influential classes but also by the majority of the people themselves.

Under the existing situation in which both the invasion of England by Germany and the invasion of the continent by England would be impossible, it was feared by the Ambassador Shigemitsu that the war would develop into one of Germany against Great Britain and might last for an indefinite period of time. [866]

On October 22, 1941 Foreign Minister Togo transmitted to Ambassador Oshima a telegram from Cape Town in South Africa, which revealed three routes being taken by United States lend‑lease material in its supply line to Russia. The first route moved by railroad and truck



[863] IV, 716.

[864] IV, 717.

[865] IV, 718.

[866] IV, 719.



191



starting at Basra on the Persian Gulf and moving North to the Caucasus via Iraq and Iran. The second route proceeded through Iran from Bandar Abu Shahr on the Persian Gulf to Teheran and thence to the Caspian Sea where it shipped across to the Russian shore or from Teheran to Tabriz where it was railroaded to the Caucasus. However, the water span proved to be limited since only two large boats could depart from wharves of the first port. Although engineers were attempting hurriedly to deepen the water sufficiently, it was believed that the railroad facilities, despite their present condition of repair, was proving the most successful of the two lines from Teheran. American lend‑lease shipments also depended upon a third route from the Indian border to Mirjawa on the Iran‑India border from which a railroad line extended to Mashed on the Iran‑Soviet border. [867]

The Japanese Ambassador at Hsingking, General Yoshijiro Umezu, expressed his views on the increasing aid Russia was receiving from England and the United States, stating that actually the help had been so meager that Stalin himself was dissatisfied. He concluded that insomuch as Russia was fighting Germany single‑handedly and was being destroyed for the benefit of England and America, he believed that it would be to Russia's advantage to make peace. Suggesting that Japan propose a peace conference to be held in Nanking after the fall of Moscow, he declared that if Japan acted as mediator, it would be performing a great service.

Ambassador Umezu itemized the conditions which he thought should be a part of this proposal:

1. The holding of a large‑scale conference during the summer of 1942;

2. Russia was to relax ties with Great Britain and the United States and was not to interfere in Japan‑China affairs; and,

3. If possible, Russia was to supply Japan with oil. [868]



395. Exchange Broadcasts Become Acceptable to Japan and Germany



On October 23, 1941, Foreign Minister Togo became impatient of the results which were to be obtained with regard to the Japanese‑German negotiations for the exchange of broadcast facilities and publicity releases. These negotiations which had been underway since August of 1941 and (see Japanese‑German Relations, Chapter 3, Volume II, Section 33‑Berlin and Tokyo Begin Negotiations for Improved Communications) concerned the exchange of memoranda which would offer to both governments the final analysis of all news coverage which was to be transmitted by private broadcasting companies. By this time there remained only a minor difference of opinion, and it was left for the two countries to compromise on that point. [869] Therefore, on October 25, Ambassador Oshima replied that the German Foreign Office had practically agreed but that its formal reply would be given the following week. [870]

Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire The final battle of the Seven Days was the first in which the Union Army occupied favorable ground. For the preceding six days, McClellan's Army of the Potomac had been retreating to the safety of the James River, pursued by Lee's Army of Northern Virginia. Up to this point, the major battles of the Seven Days had been mostly inconclusive, but McClellan was unnerved by Lee's aggressive assaults and remained convinced that he was seriously outnumbered, although in fact the two armies were roughly equal.

Malvern Hill offered good observation and artillery positions, having been prepared the previous day by the V Corps, under Brig. Gen. Fitz John Porter. McClellan himself was not present on the battlefield, having preceded his army to Harrison's Landing on the James, and Porter was the most senior of the corps commanders. The slopes were cleared of timber, providing great visibility, and the open fields to the north could be swept by deadly fire from the 250 guns placed by Col. Henry J. Hunt, McClellan's chief of artillery. Beyond this space, the terrain was swampy and thickly wooded.

The entire Army of the Potomac occupied the hill, with the exception of Brig. Gen. Silas Casey's Division, now commanded by Brig. Gen. John J. Peck, of the IV Corps, which had proceeded to Harrison's Landing and, while not engaged, formed the extreme right of the Federal line. The Federal line extended in a vast semicircle from Harrison's Landing on the extreme right to Brig. Gen. George W. Morell's division of Porter's Corps on the extreme left, which occupied the geographically advantageous ground on the northwestern slopes of the hill. Adjoining the right of Morell's command was Brig. Gen. Darius N. Couch's division, which had been detached from the IV Corps, now at Harrison's Landing, and occupied the effective center of the Federal position. Although Porter commanded the portion of the field on which Couch's troops were positioned, he elected to allow Couch to act in command independently, not bringing his detached division under the command of one of the other corps commanders. Extending the Federal line on Couch's right were the divisions of Brig. Gens. Philip Kearny and Joseph Hooker of Brig. Gen. Samuel P. Heintzelman's III Corps. To the right was Brig. Gen. Edwin Vose Sumner's II Corps, consisting of the divisions of Brig. Gens. Israel B. Richardson and John Sedgwick, which were anchored to Peck's Division of the IV Corps at Harrison's Landing.
Seven Days Battles, July 1, 1862

Rather than flanking the position, Lee attacked it directly, hoping that his artillery would clear the way for a successful infantry assault (just as he would miscalculate the following year in Pickett's Charge at Gettysburg). He also believed that his soldiers were in better fighting shape than their Union counterparts, despite the six preceding days of hard fighting and marching. (A number of the Union Corps had in fact not yet participated in direct combat, which was an indictment of McClellan's generalship, but worked out well for this final battle.) Lee's plan was to attack the hill from the north on the Quaker Road, using the divisions of Maj. Gens. Thomas J. "Stonewall" Jackson, Richard S. Ewell, D.H. Hill, and Brig. Gen. William H.C. Whiting. Maj. Gen. John B. Magruder was ordered to follow Jackson and deploy to his right when he reached the battlefield. Maj. Gen. Benjamin Huger's division was to follow as well, but Lee reserved the right to position him based on developments. The divisions of Maj. Gens. James Longstreet and A.P. Hill, which had been the most heavily engaged in the Battle of Glendale the previous day, were held in reserve.

Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire 3.3 Now there was about this time Jesus, a wise man, if it be lawful to call him a man; for he was a doer of wonderful works, a teacher of such men as receive the truth with pleasure. He drew over to him both many of the Jews and many of the Gentiles. He was [the] Christ. And when Pilate, at the suggestion of the principal men amongst us, had condemned him to the cross, those that loved him at the first did not forsake him; for he appeared to them alive again the third day; as the divine prophets had foretold these and ten thousand other wonderful things concerning him. And the tribe of Christians, so named from him, are not extinct at this day.

The first to cite this passage of Antiquities was Eusebius, writing in about 324, who quotes the passage in essentially the same form (he has πολλους των Ιουδαιων instead of πολλους Ιουδαιους, and inserts απο before του Ελληνικου).

As usual with ancient texts, the surviving sources for The Antiquities of the Jews are Greek manuscripts, all minuscules, the oldest of which dates from the 11th century. The text of Antiquities appears to have been transmitted in two halves — books 1–10 and books 11–20. But other ad hoc copies of this passage also exist.

The topic of the Testimonium's authenticity has attracted much scholarly discussion. Louis Feldman counts 87 articles published during the period of 1937-1980, "the overwhelming majority of which question its authenticity in whole or in part".

Arguments against authenticity

Origen

The Christian author Origen wrote around the year 240. His writings predate both the earliest known manuscripts of the Testimonium and the earliest quotations of the Testimonium by other writers. In his surviving works Origen fails to mention the Testimonium Flavianum, even though he was clearly familiar with the Antiquities of the Jews, since he mentions the reference by Josephus to Jesus as brother of James, which occurs later in Antiquities of the Jews (xx.9), and also other passages from Antiquities such as the passage about John the Baptist which occurs in the same chapter (xviii) as the Testimonium Furthermore, Origen states that Josephus was "not believing in Jesus as the Christ" "he did not accept Jesus as Christ" , but the Testimonium declares Jesus to be Christ. Thus it could be inferred that the version of Antiquities available to Origen did not give as positive an endorsement of Jesus as the present-day Testimonium.

On the other hand, while the evidence from Origen suggests that Josephus did not write the Testimonium in its current form, it also demonstrates, according to some scholars, that the version of the Antiquities known to Origen must have written something about Jesus, for otherwise Origen would have no reason to make the claim that Josephus "did not accept Jesus as Christ." It is possible, for example, that Origen read the original version of the Testimonium Flavianum, which textual evidence from Jerome and Michael the Syrian (see below) indicates was worded "he was believed to be the Christ" rather than "he was the Christ." According to Alice Whealey, this original version was also probably what Eusebius also had at his disposal. Whealey has argued that the wording of Michael the Syrian's Testimonium in particular, which employs the word mistabra, meaning "was supposed," has a skeptical connotation, as evidenced in the Syriac New Testament where it is used to translate Greek enomizeto of Luke 3:23. She has argued that Origen's probable exposure to a reading like Greek enomizeto (corresponding to the Syriac mistabra) in the original version of the Testimonium would readily explain Origen's statement that Josephus did not believe in Jesus as the Christ.[9] 3.3 Now there was about this time Jesus, a wise man, if it be lawful to call him a man; for he was a doer of wonderful works, a teacher of such men as receive the truth with pleasure. He drew over to him both many of the Jews and many of the Gentiles. He was [the] Christ. And when Pilate, at the suggestion of the principal men amongst us, had condemned him to the cross, those that loved him at the first did not forsake him; for he appeared to them alive again the third day; as the divine prophets had foretold these and ten thousand other wonderful things concerning him. And the tribe of Christians, so named from him, are not extinct at this day.

The first to cite this passage of Antiquities was Eusebius, writing in about 324, who quotes the passage in essentially the same form (he has πολλους των Ιουδαιων instead of πολλους Ιουδαιους, and inserts απο before του Ελληνικου).

As usual with ancient texts, the surviving sources for The Antiquities of the Jews are Greek manuscripts, all minuscules, the oldest of which dates from the 11th century. The text of Antiquities appears to have been transmitted in two halves — books 1–10 and books 11–20. But other ad hoc copies of this passage also exist.

The topic of the Testimonium's authenticity has attracted much scholarly discussion. Louis Feldman counts 87 articles published during the period of 1937-1980, "the overwhelming majority of which question its authenticity in whole or in part".

[edit] Arguments against authenticity

[edit] Origen

The Christian author Origen wrote around the year 240. His writings predate both the earliest known manuscripts of the Testimonium and the earliest quotations of the Testimonium by other writers. In his surviving works Origen fails to mention the Testimonium Flavianum, even though he was clearly familiar with the Antiquities of the Jews, since he mentions the reference by Josephus to Jesus as brother of James, which occurs later in Antiquities of the Jews (xx.9), and also other passages from Antiquities such as the passage about John the Baptist which occurs in the same chapter (xviii) as the Testimonium. Furthermore, Origen states that Josephus was "not believing in Jesus as the Christ" "he did not accept Jesus as Christ" , but the Testimonium declares Jesus to be Christ. Thus it could be inferred that the version of Antiquities available to Origen did not give as positive an endorsement of Jesus as the present-day Testimonium.

On the other hand, while the evidence from Origen suggests that Josephus did not write the Testimonium in its current form, it also demonstrates, according to some scholars, that the version of the Antiquities known to Origen must have written something about Jesus, for otherwise Origen would have no reason to make the claim that Josephus "did not accept Jesus as Christ." It is possible, for example, that Origen read the original version of the Testimonium Flavianum, which textual evidence from Jerome and Michael the Syrian (see below) indicates was worded "he was believed to be the Christ" rather than "he was the Christ." According to Alice Whealey, this original version was also probably what Eusebius also had at his disposal. [8] Whealey has argued that the wording of Michael the Syrian's Testimonium in particular, which employs the word mistabra, meaning "was supposed," has a skeptical connotation, as evidenced in the Syriac New Testament where it is used to translate Greek enomizeto of Luke 3:23. She has argued that Origen's probable exposure to a reading like Greek enomizeto (corresponding to the Syriac mistabra) in the original version of the Testimonium would readily explain Origen's statement that Josephus did not believe in Jesus as the Christ. 3.3 Now there was about this time Jesus, a wise man, if it be lawful to call him a man; for he was a doer of wonderful works, a teacher of such men as receive the truth with pleasure. He drew over to him both many of the Jews and many of the Gentiles. He was [the] Christ. And when Pilate, at the suggestion of the principal men amongst us, had condemned him to the cross, those that loved him at the first did not forsake him; for he appeared to them alive again the third day; as the divine prophets had foretold these and ten thousand other wonderful things concerning him. And the tribe of Christians, so named from him, are not extinct at this day.

The first to cite this passage of Antiquities was Eusebius, writing in about 324, who quotes the passage [2] in essentially the same form (he has πολλους των Ιουδαιων instead of πολλους Ιουδαιους, and inserts απο before του Ελληνικου).

As usual with ancient texts, the surviving sources for The Antiquities of the Jews are Greek manuscripts, all minuscules, the oldest of which dates from the 11th century.[3] The text of Antiquities appears to have been transmitted in two halves — books 1–10 and books 11–20. But other ad hoc copies of this passage also exist.

The topic of the Testimonium's authenticity has attracted much scholarly discussion. Louis Feldman counts 87 articles published during the period of 1937-1980, "the overwhelming majority of which question its authenticity in whole or in part".[4]

[edit] Arguments against authenticity

[edit] Origen

The Christian author Origen wrote around the year 240. His writings predate both the earliest known manuscripts of the Testimonium and the earliest quotations of the Testimonium by other writers. In his surviving works Origen fails to mention the Testimonium Flavianum, even though he was clearly familiar with the Antiquities of the Jews, since he mentions the reference by Josephus to Jesus as brother of James, which occurs later in Antiquities of the Jews (xx.9), and also other passages from Antiquities such as the passage about John the Baptist which occurs in the same chapter (xviii) as the Testimonium.[3] Furthermore, Origen states that Josephus was "not believing in Jesus as the Christ" [5] "he did not accept Jesus as Christ" [6], but the Testimonium declares Jesus to be Christ. Thus it could be inferred that the version of Antiquities available to Origen did not give as positive an endorsement of Jesus as the present-day Testimonium.

On the other hand, while the evidence from Origen suggests that Josephus did not write the Testimonium in its current form, it also demonstrates, according to some scholars, that the version of the Antiquities known to Origen must have written something about Jesus, for otherwise Origen would have no reason to make the claim that Josephus "did not accept Jesus as Christ." [7] It is possible, for example, that Origen read the original version of the Testimonium Flavianum, which textual evidence from Jerome and Michael the Syrian (see below) indicates was worded "he was believed to be the Christ" rather than "he was the Christ." According to Alice Whealey, this original version was also probably what Eusebius also had at his disposal. [8] Whealey has argued that the wording of Michael the Syrian's Testimonium in particular, which employs the word mistabra, meaning "was supposed," has a skeptical connotation, as evidenced in the Syriac New Testament where it is used to translate Greek enomizeto of Luke 3:23. She has argued that Origen's probable exposure to a reading like Greek enomizeto (corresponding to the Syriac mistabra) in the original version of the Testimonium would readily explain Origen's statement that Josephus did not believe in Jesus as the Christ.[9]